Dear LUNC Community, We trust this message finds you well. This proposal is to formally request the burn of funds from the Risk Harbor Multisig Wallet. We greatly appreciate your support in this matter. As circumstances have again evolved, it has become transparent that for us to retrieve the funds currently held in the treasury, we need to again revisit the formalized proposal of the following governance post: https://commonwealth.im/terra-classic/discussion/12441-discussion-burn-100-of-ozone-funds This is due to the fact that the proposal 11832 to blacklist the wallet in question was passed under the reasoning that “[b]lacklisting allows for a reversible action, enabling fund recovery through governance if valid reasons are provided by the wallet owners.”. Now that it is apparent that no fund recovery via the wallet owners is possible (i.e. latest news is that Risk Harbor has suddenly ‘lost’ the keys and on top of that they also have for some reason blocked every LUNC community member on social media and stopped any communication thereof), the reasoning behind the proposal 11832 no longer applies, and hence the blacklist serves no real purpose anymore. The purpose of this wallet as outlined by the previously rejected proposal was to insure UST holders against systemic risks within Terra. The treasury was funded by 800m UST from the community pool, which was to be used to protect the community in the event of a de-peg for example. As previously stated, there is no issue or risk regarding community ownership or provenance in the community asserting sovereignty over the funds in this wallet (terra1qyw695vaxj7jl6s4u564c6xkfe59kercg0h88w). Out of respect for the protocols and guidelines in place for the original intention of this wallet, we propose that the contents be burned by executing an internal transaction on the bank module keeper, directly on the blockchain state. This transaction would be coded into the terrad client and executed at the beginning of the block determined by L1TF (or any other members of the community taking on this task). This BeginBlock handler would wipe the balance in question by erasing the coins directly. This would require Validators to install an update to the version of terrad client (new version of terrad client) before the block determined by L1TF (or any other members of the community taking on this task). Please note that this would not halt the chain and would proceed without interruption of hash functions. We would like to put emphasis that the BeginBlock handler would only affect this wallet address (terra1qyw695vaxj7jl6s4u564c6xkfe59kercg0h88w), the treasury holding community pool USTC. This proposal would not affect any future wallets, as to repeat this handler process again, we as a community would have to vote to push another terrad client update with the L1. This will not jeopardize the integrity of the blockchain. We would like to put emphasis that the intention of the original wallet was to protect the community, and it was not utilized when the moment came to fruition and has still not been utilized after several governance proposals supporting a non-invasive method of funds retrieval. Which is why we believe we should revisit this proposal. We anticipate that through this proposal, we will display character, unity, understanding and cooperation with each other to further revive our blockchain and thus increase the value of our stablecoin, helping us succeed in the necessary steps forward to re-peg USTC to $1. Voting Yes: Authorize the L1TF (or any other members of the community taking on this task) to execute the deletion of 800m USTC in terra1qyw695vaxj7jl6s4u564c6xkfe59kercg0h88w via the bank module keeper and push an update of the terrad client to validators before the predetermined block height by L1TF (or any other members of the community taking on this task). Voting No: Proposal 11832 (blacklist) remains in effect
Submitted
09 Dec 2023, 23:16:30 UTC
Vote closed
18 Dec 2023, 22:07:16 UTC
Not approved
The proposal did not produce an approved governance action.
Current or final voting power, calculated from the on-chain tally.
Quorum
Objective network measurements at vote close plus 7, 30, and 90 days. Missing history is shown honestly, never backfilled with estimates.
Manual success criteria required
This proposal does not map cleanly to a chain-wide metric. Delivery evidence must come from its stated milestones.
/cosmos.gov.v1.MsgExecLegacyContent/cosmos.gov.v1beta1.TextProposalReached
55.54% participating
Approval
Below threshold
29.38% decisive Yes
Veto
Below threshold
10.49% of participation
What this message can change—not a prediction of price.