Dynamic Minimum Commission based on Voting Power

To confront the ongoing centralized voting power issue within the LUNC network, which has a Nakamoto index of 3 to 4 at the time of this writing, this proposal seeks to introduce a dynamic minimum commission linked to a validator's voting power. This initiative strives to foster better decentralization and safeguard the network against potential vulnerabilities due to centralization. Centralized voting power on the LUNC chain has become a troubling trend. Even with the newly introduced 5% minimum commission setting, top validators have further consolidated their voting power (VP) leading to higher centralization than before. Such centralization presents pressing issues: 1. It jeopardizes the security and trustworthiness of the network. 2. It presents barriers for smaller validators, discouraging them from participation. 3. It directly contradicts the principles of decentralization that LUNC stands for. We propose a formulaic approach, where a validator's minimum commission is directly influenced by their voting power: Minimum Commission = f(VP) = (VP-0.5) * (A + (VP/B)) with a min. commission cap at 20% Suggested initial value for A: 2.0 and for B: 10 Advantages: 1. Fostering Decentralization: Validators with less dominance can charge a more appealing commission, enticing a broader range of delegators. 2. Augmenting Network Security: By promoting decentralization, we reduce the network's vulnerability to attacks or manipulations. 3. Inherent Flexibility: The A and B parameters can be dynamically adjusted through governance (parameter change proposal) to reflect changing circumstances and challenges. Same applies for the 20% cap. Please see the full proposal including the discussion here: https://commonwealth.im/terra-classic/discussion/12872-dynamic-minimum-commission-based-on-voting-power Co-signed by StrathCole & HappyCattyCrypto